In Brussels like in Munich?
Marian Miszalski
It is hard to avoid the impression that the former KGB people from the present day Kremlin filled the Germans’ shoes before the year 1939 and decided for politics of accomplished facts, having discerned that the European Union – in spite of appearances of unity – is more divided and weaker than the announcements of the Brussels propaganda. And in fact, it is a right diagnosis: the axis of the strategic partnership Berlin – Moscow is stronger, which is clearly visible, than the ‘Brussels unity’, which exists good only on paper. And present day Russia, at least in some ways, is in a situation similar to that of the pre-war Germany: Germany had the complex of lost war and the peace treaty of Versailles. Russia has the complex of lost status as a world power and the fall of the Soviet Union. The pre-war Germany dreamt their old political dreams of expansion; present day Russia dreams its dream of rebuilding the lost zone of influence. The analogy between the last ‘Brussels summit’, concerning the reaction to the Russian intervention in Georgia, and the Munich Agreement is also justified to a certain extent. The difference is that in Munich in 1938 the European countries permitted German annexation of Czechoslovakia's part, shaking a threatening finger that it was only ‘to save peace’ and ‘for the last time’, and there was not even such a sign in Brussels on 1 September. The secessions of Abkhazia and Ossetia were recognised as ‘unlawful’, which however exposes the EU politicians to ridicule since quite recently they recognised the secession of Kosovo, the integral part of Serbia, as very ‘lawful’. They did this under the pressure of Germany: for a long time the German politics in its expansion to the Balkans has acknowledged pro-Russian Serbia as an obstacle and not without any reasons the political mainspring of the early division of former Yugoslavia was also the German politics. The fact that the EU recognised the secession of Abkhazia and Ossetia as ‘unlawful’ and did not say anything else – even did not set any deadline of the withdrawal of the Russian army from these territories – underlines the helplessness of the European Union towards Russia or rather underlines the power of the strategic partnership between Berlin and Moscow. It seems that Kosovo was the last political concession of Russia to Germany in the Balkans and Moscow made Berlin take a decisive choice: either we will play our cards in Europe right or the EU will crack and a strong anti-German political orientation will appear in Europe. ‘The Scandinavian initiative’ or the common activities of Poland, Lithuania and Estonia can be even regarded as the beginnings of such an orientation. The game of the ‘Russian chess players’ is well thought out and calculated: in both cases it pushes Germany towards Russia…
One can present this Russian game in a different way: either Germany will lead the European Union to Russia and the weak EU countries will be regarded as ‘trade goods’ within the framework of influence zones, or, facing the intensified European resistance to the Berlin-Moscow axis, the political position of Germany in the EU will be weakened and thus Germany will seek its reinforcement in Russia. The impotent stand of the EU towards the Russian attack against Georgia partly results from the fact that the EU is waiting for the stand of the United States, which depends to a large extent on the results of the November presidential election, which actually means several weeks. That’s why one of the concrete decisions of the barren summit in Brussels was the decision about … having another summit in six weeks’ time. It will take place after the presidential election in America. However, when we speak about America’s stand towards the Georgian issue it is worth noticing that the EU leaders have many a time declared with proud stamping that one of the aims of the European Union is ‘economic flight against America.’ Why then should America, against which the EU has been fighting, strengthen this hostile community?... From the American point of view, the European Union, hostile to America, – directed and disciplined by the German politics, seeking to be closer (than strategic partnership) to Russia at the costs of the rest of Europe – is not by any means a political creation, which is worth being consolidated and strengthened; on the contrary… And it is also worth noticing that the American politics supported the secession of Kosovo but it had a different intention than Germany did. Washington seems to play for EU’s disintegration under the German leadership and at the same time for Russia’s weakening, which is an ambitious but difficult policy; also because of the possible Russian help in fighting against anti-American ‘terrorism’, at least to such an extent in which it is not inspired by Moscow… And this cannot be excluded. One can even think that if Moscow cannot openly use ‘national-liberation movements’ in the world (the activists of these movements have received military and political trainings in Moscow…) – it will replace this tool of its politics by another one, more secrete…
Waiting for a ‘decisive American stand’ can bring disappointment because of other reasons, which have not been mentioned above. Such a ‘decisive stand’ would be rather connected with the victory of the Republican candidate McCain than the Democratic candidate Obama. In the meantime… let us remind ourselves of the old but good joke: ‘Nixon proved that even a poor man could govern America; Kennedy proved that a Catholic could do that; Ford – that anyone could do that’… During her campaign Hillary Clinton ensured people that her Democratic rival Barack Obama had not been a right person to become the president of America: he was young, had no experiences in foreign politics and could only deliver passionate speeches…In brief, he was only a clever demagogue… After she lost the struggle for the nomination of the Democratic Party Hillary Clinton unexpectedly … fully supported Obama as the only trustworthy candidate… One can hardly say when Hillary Clinton was sincere and one cannot exclude the possibility that she was sincere when she spoke of Obama in the way of the joke about President Ford.
"Niedziela" 37/2008